INTRODUCTION
Until recently voluntary country-of-origin labeling of food products was relatively uncommon in the United States even though the aggregate import share grew to 7percent of value and 15percent of volume of domestic food consumption in 2005 (Jerardo 2008 (Federal Register 2009) . This labeling regulation requires food retailers to notify their customers of the country of origin of various muscle cuts and ground meats, fish, perishable agricultural commodities (fresh and frozen fruits and vegetables), and nuts. In this paper, we study a model that captures some features of the food and agricultural markets covered by MCOOL, and evaluate the welfare economics of mandatory labeling that provides a cue to consumers about their willingness to pay for a product.
Most of the previous studies of product origin labeling consider producers who cannot credibly signal the quality of their products and use geographical indications (GIs) as a means of costly credible certification (for example, Zago and Pick 2004 , Lence et al. 2007 , Langinier and Babcock 2008 , Moschini, Menapace, and Pick 2008 . 2 In such cases labeling regulation (GIs) allows suppliers to transmit information about product attributes to consumers, which they could not do prior to regulation. However, as discussed in Krissoff et al (2004) , there is little evidence that consumers systemically lacked trust in the country-of-origin information provided by the US food marketing system. 3 When credible voluntary product origin labeling is possible, analyzing the effects of MCOOL requires assessing its scope. That is, we need to allow the provision of information about product origin to be endogenously determined, identify conditions under which product origin is not revealed in equilibrium, and compare equilibria with and without labeling (Carter, Krissoff, and Zwane 2006) . Such an economic analysis involves several modeling decisions that need justification.
First, we abstract from the vertical relations in the industry and consider a retailer (downstream seller) that sources a good from two countries, and can at no cost ascertain products' country of origin and choose whether to label or not label products with their country of origin. 4 Although direct labeling costs can be considerable, unlike GIs, country of origin labeling (by itself) typically does not entail significant changes in production practices other than collecting information and keeping records about product movement (Federal Register 2009) .
Second, we assume that products from different countries are differentiated in terms of quality (for example, safety) and a non-quality characteristic like flavor. In particular, we consider a version of the Hotelling model with consumers that are located along the unit interval, interpreted to be the most preferred product characteristic. A good from one country is located at point 0, and a good from the other country is located at point 1. Each country's product is also defined along a second dimension, interpreted to be product quality. We assume that consumers cannot identify the country of origin without labeling, that is, without labels consumers do not know whether a product is variety 0 or 1. As discussed in Lusk et al. (2006) , consumers may value similar products from different countries differently because of concerns with overall quality and safety as well idiosyncratic preferences. Although the food imported into the 1 An example of voluntary labeling of food products with their country of origin are lamb imports from Australia and New Zealand (Marette, Clemens and Babcock 2008) . Also, there are many examples of the use of geographical origin within the United States as a basis for branding commodities such as Main lobster, Kona coffee, Idaho potatoes, Napa Valley wine, Vidalia onions, Washington State apples, Texas Ruby Red grapefruits, and Florida orange juice (Hayes, Lence, and Babcock 2005) .
2 Geographical indications (GIs) such as Protected Designation of Origin or Protected Geographical Indication have long been used by agricultural producers in the European Union. GIs not only indicate origin of the food product but also convey a certain quality and product specification (European Commission 2007). United States is subjected to the same safety standards as domestically grown food, production methods may still vary across exporting countries (Krissoff et al 2004) . Such variability tends to result in unique flavor or nutritional content (and other experience or credence attributes) of food products from different countries (Umberger et al. 2002 , Sitz et al. 2005 , Feuz et al. 2007 ).
Third, we assume that the production costs (or wholesale prices) for products from different countries are subject to country-specific random shocks that are not observable to consumers. Most of the commodities covered by the mandatory labeling policy (muscle cuts and ground meats, and fruits and vegetables) are characterized by relatively short shelf-life and seasonal variations in supply. When domestic supply is low or unavailable, and storage is costly, off-season demand is met by imports, and the imported and domestic varieties are typically marketed during different (possibly overlapping) time periods (Huang and Huang 2007) . 5 Note that in the context of labeling what is unknown to consumers is the content (country of origin) of a particular unit of a product. So we assume that consumers know their willingness to pay for variety 0 and variety 1 (which is a sum of common and idiosyncratic components), but cannot distinguish between them without labels. Although throughout our analysis we assume that the overall quality of each variety is fixed, the differences in quality across varieties can be interpreted as publicly known shocks to quality. Quality shocks such as food contamination and disease outbreaks tend to be (perhaps with a lag) widely reported in the media, while country-specific input prices and product availability tend to receive less public attention.
When production costs are constant, as shown by Wolinsky (1987) , a menu of labeled varieties and an unlabeled (unidentified) variety allows the seller to more effectively sort consumers according to their willingness to pay. Buyers who strongly prefer one of the varieties choose the appropriate labeled variety, and indifferent buyers choose a cheaper unlabeled variety. In this paper we analyze an extension of Wolinsky's (1987) model and consider what happens when production costs are subject to varietyspecific shocks that are not observable to buyers, and the seller is free to change the variety of the unlabeled product when the relative costs change. In order to avoid "indirect" disclosure of the identity of the least-cost variety to buyers, the seller's pricing strategy must be such that it does not reveal her cost structure. To our knowledge this is the first paper to study labeling of products with variety by a multiproduct firm in a framework with "universal private information" where consumers privately observe their preferences and the firm privately observes its production costs. 6 In Section 3, we characterize equilibrium when quality is symmetric and high relative to the variability in idiosyncratic consumer valuations and production costs. In equilibrium the seller raises prices for both labeled varieties when the ex post cost differential increases. As a result the unlabeled product that consists of the cheaper variety is purchased by more consumers who remain in the dark about its true identity. For intermediate levels of ex ante cost variability the seller typically serves many or all consumers with an unlabeled variety, and nondisclosure is most common. On the one hand, for small cost variability there is more disclosure, because the seller targets consumers who strongly prefer a particular variety with relatively cheap labeled varieties. On the other hand, there is also more disclosure when ex ante cost variability is large, because the seller has no reason to hide the identity of the ex post least-cost variety when it is very expensive.
We also consider equilibrium with asymmetric quality across varieties. For small quality asymmetry and cost variability, equilibrium is similar to the case of symmetric quality. However, for large quality asymmetry prices tend to be more informative about relative costs, and the characterization 5 For example, Kay (2008) reported that "…any additional segregation of livestock and finished product will translate into higher wholesale prices and reduced product availability, Tyson warns" (italics added). Also, surveys of Belgium consumers found that origin-labeled meat products were perceived as less convenient to purchase due to reduced availability (Verbeke and Roosen 2009) . 6 Daughety and Reinganum (2007) introduce this term to describe an environment in which firms privately observe the quality of their product and consumers privately observe their preferences. They assume that firms make disclosure decisions before they learn their quality. Here we consider a firm that makes disclosure decisions after it observes its production costs for varieties that may differ in overall quality. of equilibrium depends on the distribution of cost shocks. We completely characterize equilibrium for different levels of quality asymmetry in a special case with negatively dependent binary cost shocks. When quality asymmetry is sufficiently great and cost variability is not too great, disclosure is "qualitybiased" whereas the seller always offers the labeled high-quality variety and an unlabeled product that can consist of either variety. However, if quality asymmetry is not too great and cost variability is sufficiently great, variety is never disclosed in equilibrium.
In Section 4, we analyze the effects of mandatory disclosure on welfare. We find that although it benefits consumers, the overall welfare may increase or decrease. This is because the seller tends to oversupply the cheaper variety under voluntary disclosure but undersupply it under mandatory disclosure. Suppose that quality is symmetric and high, so that the market is covered (each consumer participates in the market) before and after the policy. Then mandatory disclosure will increase ex post social welfare for small cost differentials but decrease it for large cost differentials. When costs are similar across varieties most consumers should get their preferred variety, and this is what happens under mandatory disclosure. When costs are very different across varieties, most consumers should be served with the cheaper variety, and this is what happens in equilibrium with no disclosure. For moderate differences in costs there are distortions before and after the policy: The seller serves too many consumers with the cheaper variety under voluntary disclosure and too few under voluntary disclosure.
And so, mandatory disclosure increases expected social welfare (that is, before costs are known to an independent observer) for small cost variability, but decreases it for large cost variability. Mandatory disclosure is also tends to decrease expected welfare when costs are negatively correlated as large cost differentials become more likely. It is worth pointing out that under "large" cost variability production costs may exceed the choke-off demand price. In the context of country of origin labeling, "large" country-specific cost variability can be caused by seasonality in agricultural production whereby product availability fluctuates during the year and varies across exporting countries. However, even with large and negatively correlated cost shocks, mandatory disclosure may increase expected welfare if quality asymmetry is large. This happens when welfare gains from avoiding overconsumption of the cheap lowquality variety, on average, offset welfare losses from underconsumption of the cheap high-quality variety as a result of the policy.
In Section 5, we investigate whether competition among multi-product firms generates more disclosure of variety in equilibrium. We consider spatially differentiated firms that source varieties in the same upstream market, and demonstrate that independent firms may also practice nondisclosure. Suppose that only one of the varieties is available in the upstream market, but consumers do not know which one. Then in a non-cooperative equilibrium a firm that expects that the other firm will not disclose its variety, will not achieve higher profits from its own disclosure. On the one hand, if firms are located close to each other and price competition is fierce, the disclosing firm will not be able to raise its price without losing many customers. This is because consumers, who now know which variety is available, will be attracted by the low price at the non-disclosing firm even if it continues to market unlabeled products. On the other hand, if the firms are far apart and price competition is not fierce, the disclosing firm (as well as the nondisclosing firm) will earn a lower profit due to a reduction in sales to consumers who find out that the available variety is not a good match for them.
Our results suggest that, even without accounting for the direct costs of implementing MCOOL, it may decrease social welfare. In particular, this may happen when most consumers view products from different countries as close substitutes, and wholesale prices in different countries are volatile and uncorrelated. The model demonstrates that the characteristics of exporting countries such as history of food safety lapses (vertical quality), production methods (horizontal attributes), and growing seasons (product availability and cost volatility) can play a rather nuanced role in both the scope and the effects of MCOOL on welfare. To the extent that geographic distance between areas where products originate may increase the heterogeneity in consumer preferences and weaken the correlation between wholesale prices, the model predicts a positive relationship between the prevalence of voluntary country of origin labeling and the distances to and among exporting countries during the pre-MCOOL period. Our modeling approach complements the current studies of the effects of MCOOL on welfare that take into account the additional direct costs created by the policy (Jones, Somwaru, and Whitaker 2009) , and suggests that a more complete assessment should include the information effects of the policy on the demand and supply side of the market.
Our findings can also be used to shed light on other issues in the economics of food labeling (Golan, Kuchler, and Mitchell 2000) . For example, consumers had little knowledge that relatively cheap soybean oil and corn sweeteners had been replacing saturated fats and sugar in many packaged foods during the 1970s and 1980s (Golan and Unnevehr 2008) . The reversion of these trends started with the US Food and Drug Administration regulation requiring disclosure of trans fat content on nutrition labels and increased media attention (Unnevehr and Jagmanaite 2008; Hailu, Cranfield, and Thangaraj 2010 ). In our model, variety 0 can correspond to a product that contains partially hydrogenated soybean oil, and variety 1 can correspond to a similar product that contains a substitute ingredient such as palm oil. With this interpretation our analysis suggests a signaling explanation of why a large share of products lacked detailed nutrition labeling in spite of the apparent potential for product differentiation before the Nutritional Labeling and Education Act of 1990 went into effect (Caswell 1992) .
Related Literature
An early finding in the literature on quality disclosure is that a privately informed seller voluntarily discloses all information if disclosure is costlessly credible (Grossman and Hart 1980, Milgrom and Roberts 1986) . The subsequent literature demonstrated that complete unraveling breaks down and some nondisclosure occurs in models with costly disclosure, incomplete product information of the seller, irrational consumers, and competition (see Milgrom 2008 and references therein). The disclosure of product variety generally reveals both public (what is the overall quality of a given product) and private information (how far away is a given product from the buyer's ideal variety) to each potential buyer. Then buyers' private information may play the role of the disclosure "cost" because, all else equal, the seller can extract more surplus from buyers who have less private information. The nondisclosure result in the presence of private information is obtained in Sun (2010) who shows that a monopolist may not disclose product characteristics when consumers are uncertain about both vertical quality and horizontal attributes of a product. However, in the existing models of product information disclosure the attributes of a product are exogenous to the seller's problem. A novel feature of our model is that consumer uncertainty about product characteristics is endogenous as it is driven by the seller's supply decisions in the presence of input cost variability.
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The firm's incentives to provide buyers with private information about their own valuations for its products are also studied in the literature on informative advertising (Lewis and Sappington (1994) , Johnson and Myatt (2006) , Anderson and Renault (2006) , Saak (2008) , and Anderson and Renault 2009) . In contrast, following Wolinsky (1987) , we focus on consumers' uncertainty about the characteristics of a particular product rather than individual match values for a product with known characteristics, and consider a seller that can package different products with different amounts of information.
Also, Ottaviani and Prat (2001) show that the monopolist achieves higher expected profits by committing to publicly reveal her private information under affiliation between the seller's and buyers' private signals. In our model there is no commitment and the seller decides which products to label with variety after she observes her production costs. Moscarini and Ottaviani (2001) consider buyers who are uncertain about their match value for a variety, and show that the sellers' equilibrium profits may fall with the revelation of public information. However, they assume that each seller offers a different variety of a good, and do not consider multi-product sellers.
MODEL
We consider an extension of Wolinsky's (1987) q is a variety-specific quality shock (that is, a variety-specific common component of consumer valuations), which is publicly observed by the seller and consumers,
. If the identity of the variety offered for sale is not disclosed by the seller (that is, the product is not labeled with its variety), consumers cannot find out what it is prior to purchase. For example, different varieties of packaged foods, meats, fruits, and vegetables can be similar in appearance but differ in experience and credence attributes such as flavor or nutritional content. We assume that consumers are risk-neutral, and if a consumer at x believes that there is probability h that the unlabeled product is of variety 1 (and, therefore, probability h − 1 that the unlabeled product is of variety 0), then she is willing to pay
for one unit of the unlabeled product. When deciding which product to buy, a consumer chooses the product that provides the greatest expected utility net of price, or stays out of the market and obtains a reservation utility of zero.
We consider two information regimes: voluntary and mandatory disclosure (labeling) of a product's variety. We assume that, if provided, labeling is truthful. In the voluntary labeling regime, the monopolist decides whether or not to label a product with variety. In the mandatory labeling regime, the monopolist must label each product with its variety. Even though the direct costs of information disclosure including labeling, testing, and keeping records may be significant, they are ignored in the analysis to follow. Accounting for such costs will not change our main findings that full nondisclosure can occur in equilibrium, and that mandatory disclosure can reduce welfare even when all consumers participate in the market before and after the policy is implemented.
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Timing of decisions is as follows. First, the buyers and the monopolist observe i q , each buyer privately observes his ideal variety, x , and the monopolist privately observes her production costs i c ,
. Second, the monopolist sets the prices for labeled and unlabeled products,
Third, having seen product prices, buyers update their beliefs about the variety of an unlabeled product (if it is offered for sale) and make their purchasing decisions. Finally, the monopolist produces to satisfy demand.
EQUILIBRIUM
Consider an equilibrium in which the monopolist offers labeled and unlabeled varieties. Let 
)] , 
A pure pricing strategy perfect Bayesian equilibrium is defined as follows.
Definition. An equilibrium consists of consumers' beliefs
the pricing strategies are optimal given consumers' belief
gives the true conditional probability that the unlabeled product consists of variety 1, if the seller employs pricing strategies
Although in equilibrium consumers have a common belief that follows the rule of Bayesian updating, there are no restrictions on the out-of-equilibrium consumers' beliefs, which may vary across consumers. We will allow for heterogeneous out-of-equilibrium consumers' beliefs, whereas n h becomes a function of x (as well as the posted prices). At out-of-equilibrium prices demand functions are given by
denote the set of prices generated by the pricing strategy
We characterize the perfect Bayesian equilibria in which the seller achieves the greatest expected profit (before the seller observes her production costs), which we refer to as the "best" (for the seller) equilibria. There are several reasons why one may be interested in equilibria that maximize the firm's expected profits. From a positive point of view, a firm that convinces its customers to play a best equilibrium has a higher expected valuation than any other, otherwise identical, firm, and thus is more likely to enter and stay in the market. From a normative point of view, this equilibrium provides a useful benchmark for the analysis of the mandatory disclosure policy as we can focus on the social inefficiency (if any) of the privately optimal disclosure and pricing strategies.
A best equilibrium can be recovered as a solution to the seller's expected-profit-maximization problem:
where
is the vector of prices posted by the seller. In problem (3) constraint (i) states that the seller finds it optimal ex post (after she observes her production costs) to implement the pricing strategy that was chosen ex ante (before she observes her production costs). Constraint (ii) states that consumers' beliefs are given by the true conditional probabilities along the equilibrium path. 
Symmetric Quality
As a starting point, it is useful to consider a socially efficient allocation in which each consumer gets the variety that has the lowest sum of the production and disutility costs:
In the socially efficient allocation all consumers are served for all realizations of costs if horizontal differentiation and cost variability are small relative to overall quality, that is,
. 9 We first characterize equilibrium when this condition holds, and there are potentially profitable trades with each consumer for all
The search for a best equilibrium by directly solving (3) is a daunting task because to assure that there are no other equilibria in which the seller achieves a greater expected profit, we need to consider all possible consumers' beliefs that follow the rule of Bayesian updating. However, the search for a best equilibrium is simplified by Lemma 1. To establish this upper bound on equilibrium expected profits we assume that consumers directly observe (noisy) signals with the content that would have been revealed had the seller committed to her pricing strategy before observing input prices.
10 This yields a two-stage optimization problem whereas the seller chooses (1) the structure of publicly observed signals, and (2) prices conditional on the public signals. Because we assume that these public signals arrive independently of prices, the seller cannot manipulate consumers' beliefs, and the posted prices, in fact, do not reveal any additional information to consumers.
In the proof of Lemma 1, we first show that in an equilibrium in which the seller achieves the highest expected profit, consumers may know that . 10 Recall that in equilibrium consumers use the posted prices to update their beliefs about the realized input costs. The prices send "noisy" public signals when the same price is offered for different input costs so that the updated probability distribution is not concentrated on a single point. Note that, as usual in Bayesian games, a plethora of customers' beliefs about what the posted prices imply about the input costs may constitute a perfect Bayesian equilibrium. To find a system of beliefs that maximizes the seller's expected profits, we use a technical trick that consists of letting the seller directly choose what customers know about the actual input costs. In order to assure that the information structure chosen by the seller is supported in equilibrium we require that the prices depend only on the public information about costs that is, directly revealed by the seller (that is, are measureable with respect to the public signals).
= . Second, we find the prices that maximize the expected
If in a candidate equilibrium expected profits reach the upper bound established in Lemma 1, then we know that the candidate equilibrium is, in fact, a best equilibrium. It can also be shown that a best equilibrium is essentially unique (up to the specification of out-of-equilibrium beliefs).
Let us consider the following system of consumers' beliefs:
The out-of-equilibrium consumers' beliefs
are specified as follows: 
, because all consumers believe that the variety of unlabeled product is 0 (or 1). Hence, there is no demand for the unlabeled product because the labeled product 0 (or 1) is cheaper. Finally, for
believe that the variety of the unlabeled product is 0 (1). Hence,
, and there is no demand for labeled products of either variety.
Thus, the out-of-equilibrium beliefs in (7) are such that by setting prices
, and by setting prices
is the highest profits that the seller can achieve under full disclosure.
Our main result is the following characterization of the best perfect Bayesian equilibrium that is, supported by consumers' beliefs in (6). 
3. the market shares of each labeled and an unlabeled variety are 
Even though the market shares of labeled varieties and the unlabeled product depend on the cost differential, consumers never learn which variety is cheaper. The seller offers both labeled and unlabeled products (or just an unlabeled product) when the cost differential is less (greater) than horizontal differentiation, Were buyers not updating their beliefs, the seller would charge a higher (lower) price for a more expensive (cheaper) variety. However, in equilibrium labeled products are priced similarly in order to hide the identity of the cheaper variety from consumers. The price of labeled products is an increasing piece-wise linear function of the absolute value of the cost differential. Recall that the prices in (9) solve (5), and equate the marginal conditional expected profits across the three segments served with products submarket for an unlabeled variety that becomes relatively cheaper to produce, and contraction of the submarkets for the labeled varieties that, on average, become relatively more expensive to produce.
If
, such a pricing strategy may no longer be optimal for some input costs. In this case, if both varieties are too expensive, the seller may achieve higher profits by offering labeled varieties at different prices and revealing the identity of the cheaper variety. The following example illustrates. 
However, there is another pricing strategy that may generate higher profits. By offering only labeled varieties at "revealing" prices
, that maximize (8), the seller earns
By comparing (12) and (13), we see that the seller achieves higher profits by offering only labeled products if both varieties are sufficiently expensive, that is, Figure 3 .2). Note that with symmetric quality the seller is equally likely to achieve higher profits by posting "revealing" prices 
Asymmetric Quality
We now suppose that varieties 0 and 1 differ in overall quality, and assume that
When the quality differential and cost variability are small relative to the horizontal differentiation,
, and the average quality is high relative to the cost variability and horizontal differentiation, (15)
Using arguments that are similar to the ones used to establish Proposition 1 it can be shown that constraint (i) in problem (3) is satisfied for all 1 0 , c c , when the system of consumers' beliefs is given by (6) but with the set of equilibrium prices * P that is, generated by the pricing strategy in (15), and the outof-equilibrium consumers' beliefs that are specified as follows
(16) assures that the seller does not gain from deviating from the announced pricing strategy in (15) for any 1 0 , c c . Thus, the pricing strategy in (15) combined with this system of consumers' beliefs constitute an equilibrium. The variation in equilibrium prices for labeled varieties in (15) only reflects the difference in overall quality but reveals nothing about the identity of the cheaper variety. Although the seller offers the labeled high-quality and low-quality varieties and an unlabeled variety, the market share of the labeled high-quality variety is greater than that of the low-quality variety.
When the quality differential and cost variability are large relative to the horizontal differentiation, t > ∆ + σ , or the average quality is low relative to cost variability and horizontal differentiation, t q 2 1 + < σ , in the best equilibrium consumers may learn from prices about which variety is likely to be cheaper. A characterization of the best equilibrium will now depend on the distribution of costs, G . To investigate the effect of quality asymmetry on the equilibrium pricing strategy and the patterns of disclosure, we consider a special case when input costs take only two values and exhibit perfect negative dependence with
For this distribution of costs, in a pure pricing strategy equilibrium, prices necessarily convey either null or full information about the actual costs. To see why, suppose that in equilibrium the seller offers an unlabeled variety for 
) consumers, who know the seller's pricing strategy, will easily infer from the posted prices which variety is cheaper.
And so, if in the best equilibrium the seller offers an unlabeled variety, then the equilibrium is given by the solution to the following problem:
where 
By solving (17) we obtain the following characterization of the best equilibrium that is, supported by the consumers' beliefs in (6) and the out-of-equilibrium beliefs in (16). If ∆ − ≤ 1 σ (area 1), the seller offers all three products (this is a special case of the pricing strategy in (15)). The price premium for the high-quality variety (and its market share) increases with the quality differential. As in the case with symmetric quality, the prices of both labeled varieties increase and their market shares fall when cost variability is greater.
If cost variability is in some intermediate range,
, the seller only labels the high-quality variety and expands the share of the market served with an unlabeled variety (area 2). In this case, the low-quality variety is unattractive even for consumers whose ideal variety is close to 1, and the seller does not create a niche market for that variety.
If the quality differential is sufficiently large,
, and the cost variability is large (but not too large), If the quality differential is not too large,
, and the cost variability is sufficiently large, ∆ + ≥ 1 σ , the seller offers only an unlabeled variety (area 4). Even when the high-quality variety is cheaper, the seller serves the entire market with an unlabeled product because lowering the price for the labeled high-quality variety will reveal to consumers the identity of the unlabeled product. The seller achieves higher expected profits from offering a single product of an unknown variety (complete nondisclosure) than being forced to offer the labeled high-quality variety when it is expensive.
Finally, if both the quality differential and the cost variability are sufficiently large, Unlike in the case with symmetric quality, the "pricing strategy implementation" constraint for
in (17b) binds when the quality differential is large. Because non-revealing prices maximize the seller's expected profits, were consumers unable to learn from the posted prices, the seller would prefer to lower the price of the labeled high-quality variety when its actual cost is low. If the gain in profits from serving a larger share of the market with the labeled high-quality variety is sufficiently great, the seller, in fact, prefers to post revealing prices. Of course, this would be anticipated by consumers and ruin the seller's ability to offer an unlabeled variety when the high-quality variety is expensive,
MANDATORY DISCLOSURE
In this section we consider the effect of mandatory labeling of products with their variety on welfare. We begin with the case when quality is symmetric and sufficiently high,
. Then under both voluntary and mandatory labeling the market is covered (each consumer trades with the seller) for any realization of costs. As a result, mandatory labeling only affects the allocation of varieties across consumers but not the number of consumers who participate in the market.
Under mandatory labeling the equilibrium prices maximize (8) , where the inequality follows by (9). And so, each consumer gains under mandatory labeling. Consumers who used to purchase the labeled varieties under voluntary labeling are better off because their prices decrease. Consumers who used to purchase an unlabeled variety do not lose anything from not being offered an unlabeled product, but gain from the reduction in prices for the labeled varieties. , and consumers are made better off by the policy as they enjoy lower prices without suffering any loss from not being offered an unlabeled variety. However, social welfare is now more likely to decrease because fewer consumers participate in the market under mandatory labeling even though some trade between the seller and each consumer is better than no trade.
14 Finally, if σ + < < 2 2 t t q , the price for the more expensive labeled variety increases after the policy goes into effect. Nonetheless, the overall impact on consumer welfare (as a group) remains positive, and the impact on social welfare is ambiguous as in the previous two cases. For 2 t q ≤ , the policy has no effect, because the seller never offers an unlabeled variety.
Mandatory Disclosure with Asymmetric Quality
Now we consider the effect of mandatory disclosure on welfare when quality is asymmetric across varieties with
. For moderate quality asymmetry, compared with the symmetric quality case, mandatory disclosure is more (less) likely to decrease overall welfare when the high-quality variety is cheaper (more expensive) than the low-quality variety. Suppose that quality asymmetry and cost variability are small relative to the variability in idiosyncratic valuations, Yet, a small increase in quality asymmetry has no impact on the change in expected social welfare due to full disclosure,
, because the distribution of 1 0 ,C C is symmetric. This is because a small increase in quality asymmetry increases the supply of the high-quality variety at the same rate before and after mandatory disclosure.
Nonetheless, for large quality asymmetry mandatory disclosure may increase expected social welfare even when relative input cost variability is large. Consider the special case with negatively dependent binary cost shocks in Section 3 and suppose that ∆ + > 1 σ 
COMPETITION
Here we show that product variety may not be disclosed in equilibrium with competition among multiproduct sellers. Consider a market with two spatially differentiated firms, A and B, that are located at the opposite ends of the "street" of unit length (see Figure 5 .1). Both firms source varieties, 0 and 1, in the same upstream market (that is, the realizations of 1 0 , C C are common to both firms). Firms are pricetakers in the upstream market but independently choose prices and disclosure strategy in the downstream market. 
, where β is the traveling cost (both ways) per unit of distance. We assume that the traveling cost is not too high, 
, where j n h , is the consumers' belief that an unlabeled product supplied by firm j consists of variety 1. We assume that in equilibrium all consumers are served in the market. Then all consumers with 
It is easy to verify that the Nash-Bertrand equilibrium (conditional on both firms offering only an unlabeled variety) is given by
, and each firm earns β 2 1 . Now we show that neither firm wants to deviate and offer a labeled product. Suppose to the contrary that a firm deviates and offers a labeled variety (possibly along with an unlabeled variety). Then consumers immediately find out which variety is cheaper because σ ≤ q and firms will never supply the more expensive variety. This leads to full disclosure of the identity of the variety that is, offered by both firms. Suppose that 
will shop at firm A, where
. And so, firm A that labels its products earns at most Competition does not necessarily lead to disclosure of the identity of the currently available variety because labeling cannot increase sales for the disclosing firm. On the one hand, consumers, who prefer the currently available variety, are attracted by the cheap unlabeled product offered by the competitor (that consumers now know consists of their preferred variety). On the other hand, consumers, who prefer the currently unavailable variety and were previously purchasing an unlabeled variety, may now prefer to stay out of the market.
CONCLUSIONS
We have developed a theory of product information disclosure through labeling by a multi-product firm that faces random input costs. Compared to the literature on quality disclosure (Milgrom 2008) , the approach adopted in this paper is more general since it allows for "incomplete disclosure," that is, the case in which the firm can optimally choose to simultaneously supply the products with disclosed and undisclosed attributes. In our model nondisclosure of variety is due to two-sided uncertainty whereas consumers do not know which variety is cheaper to supply and the firm does not observe buyers' preferences.
The main findings of the paper are that 1. full nondisclosure can occur in equilibrium even when disclosure per se is costless. 2. mandatory disclosure can reduce welfare even when all consumers participate in the market before and after the policy is implemented and when the implementation of the policy does not add additional costs. 3. competition might not lead to disclosure.
We show that the extent of nondisclosure depends on the difference in overall quality, heterogeneity in consumer preferences, and cost variability. Our finding that in imperfectly competitive markets regulation by transparency may not automatically increase welfare is explained by distortions in allocation of varieties across consumers that continue to exist under full disclosure. Specifically, we show that mandatory disclosure of variety decreases welfare when relative input costs are volatile and varieties are similar in overall quality. In our model mandatory disclosure may not only reduce the size of the market, but also worsen the distortion in the allocation of the market shares across varieties: the market share allocated to the cheaper variety tends to be too large under voluntary disclosure, but it tends to be too small under mandatory disclosure.
When varieties are differentiated by experience attributes, a more realistic assumption is that consumers are initially uninformed about their valuations for different varieties and slowly learn about them by purchasing different products over time (Bergemann and Valimaki 2006) . With consumer learning the provision of information about product variety has two additional "dynamic" effects that are absent in the static setting:
1. Inexperienced consumers (that is, those who have not tried one or both varieties) are willing to pay more because they will be able to make better purchasing decisions in the future if they know which variety they buy today; 2. Incompletely experienced consumers (that is, those who have tried only one variety) with negative experiences may buy less frequently because they stop buying the variety for which they have low valuations as soon as they learn about it. An interesting distinction is whether, without labels, consumers can tell which varieties they have already tried. If they cannot, withholding the identity of a product's variety benefits the seller because consumers with low valuations buy more frequently and stay in the market longer as they are not sure whether or not they have encountered both varieties in their previous trials and keep on hoping that the variety that they like is still out there. Our goal in future work is to sort out these effects and to explore optimal disclosure of product characteristics in a dynamic model with consumer learning.
APPENDIX
To prove Lemma 1 it will be useful to establish the following property of the profit function. Let denote the maximum profits for given costs 
. Hence, provided that all three products are offered, (1) becomes: Step 2, we show that public signals should be uninformative about the identity of the cheaper variety. In Step 3, we derive the exact formula.
Step 1. Suppose that in a best equilibrium the pure pricing strategy is a garbled signal of relative costs, that is,
Then the pricing strategy 
And so, we consider the following approximation to (3): Step 2. It is convenient to view (A9) as a two-stage optimization problem: (1) find maximum profits for given ∈ z C Ω , and (2) find an optimal Ω . We first show that at optimum 
so that
. This is illustrated in the first panel in Figure A .1.
Consider a transformed (more fine) cover
, where 
The first (strict) inequality follows because, by assumption,
, where the inequality follows from Lemma 0 because, by construction, 
The first equality follows by (A1) and (A12). The inequality follows because re-optimization over prices cannot decrease the seller's profits. This yields the desired contradiction.
Step 3. In Step 2 we showed that an optimal Ω is such that 
There are five cases that need to be considered. Case (a). Suppose that ∆ − ≤ 1 σ . In this case, as we will verify next, constraints (A24) and (A25) do not bind, and the seller offers all three products at prices 
The larger root is 
